FIRST SECTION
CASE OF ANDREANI AND OTHERS v. ITALY
(Applications nos. 44596/18 and 2 others – see appended list)
JUDGMENT
Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Reasonable time • Excessive length of proceedings
Art 13 ( Art 6 § 1) • Effective remedy • Post-2012 “Pinto” compensatory remedy ineffective for excessive length of proceedings • Inadequate redress • Domestic courts’ interpretation and application of the statutory cap on the compensation award resulting in an irrebuttable presumption of the award’s adequacy without a genuine assessment of the actual prejudice suffered
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.
STRASBOURG
29 October 2026
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Andreani and Others v. Italy,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Erik Wennerström, President, Raffaele Sabato, Frédéric Krenc, Davor Derenčinović, Alain Chablais, Artūrs Kučs, Anna Adamska-Gallant, judges,and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications nos. 44596/18, 13410/23 and 36375/24 against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated therein;
the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention to the Italian Government (“the Government”) and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible;
the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants;
Having deliberated in private on 6 October 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The applications concern the excessive length of domestic proceedings and the effectiveness of the compensatory remedy available under the Pinto Act following amendments in 2012, which introduced a statutory cap whereby compensation cannot exceed the value of the claim in the underlying proceedings.
THE FACTS
2. The applicants’ personal details and the names of their representatives are set out in the appended table.
3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr L. D’Ascia, Avvocato dello Stato.
4. The essential details of the domestic proceedings in which the applicants were involved are set out in the appended table.
5. On the basis of Law no. 89 of 24 March 2001 (as amended by Law no. 134 of 7 August 2012), commonly referred to as the “Pinto Act”, the applicants claimed compensation for the excessive length of the proceedings to which they were party. As a result, they were awarded sums corresponding to the value of the claims at issue in the main proceedings – that is, the maximum amount of compensation payable under Section 2 bis, paragraph 3, of the Pinto Act (see paragraph 7 below).
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
6. The relevant domestic law and case-law concerning the Pinto Act is set out in Cocchiarella v. Italy ([GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 23-31, ECHR 2006‑V). The Pinto Act was subsequently amended in 2012 (Decree-Law no. 83 of 2012, converted into Law no. 134 of 7 August 2012).
7. The relevant provision of the Pinto Act, following the above-mentioned amendments, states as follows:
Section 2 bis (Amount of compensation)
“1. As a general rule, the court shall award, by way of fair compensation, a sum of money not lower than EUR 400 and not higher than EUR 800 for each year, or part of a year exceeding six months, by which the length of the proceedings exceeds the reasonable time requirement. The sum awarded may be increased by up to 20% for each year following the third year and by up to 40% for each year following the seventh year.
...
3. The amount of compensation, even where derogating from paragraph 1, may not exceed the value of the claim or, if lower, the value of the right as ascertained by the court.”
8. By Orders nos. 124, 204 and 240 of 2014, the Constitutional Court held that Section 2 bis of the Pinto Act applied only where a court had recognised a breach of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time in favour of a litigant and where the established value of the claim in the main proceedings constituted an objective element unaffected by the stance, in the principal action, adopted by the litigant seeking compensation for that breach. The Constitutional Court further clarified that any assessment of the legitimacy of the limit on the value of the right established by the court was outside the scope of the constitutionality review proceedings.
9. In the case-law of the Court of Cassation (see, inter alia, judgment no. 4283 of 2017), the question of constitutional legitimacy raised with regard to Section 2 bis, paragraph 3, of the Pinto Act was found to be manifestly ill‑founded, since that provision, “by ensuring a closer link between the financial significance of the legal claim and the damage suffered by the litigant while awaiting a decision, serve[d] the purpose of avoiding the risk of excessive compensation for non-pecuniary damage being paid”.
THE LAW
10. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.
11. The applicants complained that the length of the relevant domestic proceedings had been excessive (see the appended table). They invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
12. They also complained, under Article 13 of the Convention, that the 2012 amendment of the Pinto Act, introducing a statutory limit that the compensation cannot exceed the value of the claim, had rendered the remedy available in domestic law ineffective. Article 13 reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
13. The Government submitted that the applications should be declared inadmissible for lack of victim status within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. They argued that the applicants had already obtained adequate redress at domestic level, as the Court of Appeal had acknowledged the alleged violation and had awarded them compensation corresponding to the value of the right at issue. In their view, the compensation granted was appropriate and fully in line with domestic law, with the result that the applications had become devoid of purpose and the applicants no longer had a legally protected interest in pursuing their complaints before the Court.
14. As to the merits, the Government argued that the legal framework at stake provided for amounts of compensation which are strictly linked and congruous with the actual suffering experienced by the applicants.
15. The applicants in application no. 36375/24 submitted that, notwithstanding the domestic acknowledgment of a violation, they remained victims within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention because the compensation awarded under the Pinto proceedings had been substantially reduced as a result of the statutory cap introduced by Section 2 bis, paragraph 3, of the Pinto Act. They argued that compensation for excessive length of proceedings should be assessed independently of the value of the underlying dispute and should provide adequate redress for the non-pecuniary damage resulting from the delay. They also criticised the domestic courts’ interpretation of Section 2 bis, paragraph 3, whereby the value of the claim had been further reduced by excluding accrued interest and inflation adjustments and by deducting sums received from other sources during the proceedings. In their view, these restrictions had deprived the Pinto remedy of its effectiveness and had prevented it from providing compensation comparable to that awarded by the Court in similar cases. There had thus been a violation of their rights under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.
16. The applicant in application no. 13410/23 likewise argued that the domestic authorities had failed to provide adequate compensation for the excessive length of the proceedings. He submitted that the amount awarded to him under Section 2 bis, paragraph 3, of the Pinto Act had in reality been lower than the value of the underlying claim. In his view, the domestic courts’ restrictive interpretation of the statutory ceiling was incompatible with the Convention standards concerning adequate redress for excessive length of proceedings, amounting to a violation of Article 13 of the Convention. He also maintained that his right to a hearing within a reasonable time had been violated.
17. The applicant in application no. 44596/18 did not submit any observations.
18. The Court considers that the Government’s objection of loss of victim status, based on the reasoning that the amounts awarded at national level were appropriate in the light of Section 2 bis, paragraph 3, of the Pinto Act, is closely linked to the issue of whether an effective remedy existed within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention and will therefore join it to the merits of the complaint under Article 13 (see, mutatis mutandis, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156, ECHR 2000-XI; De Souza Ribeiro v. France (GC), no. 22689/07, § 76, 13 December 2012; and Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, § 111, ECHR 2012).
19. The Court further finds that the applications are neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. They must therefore be declared admissible.
20. The Court refers to the leading case of Olivieri and Others v. Italy (nos. 17708/12 and 3 others, 25 February 2016) where it identified a violation of Article 13 of the Convention arising from the Pinto Act for the first time and subsequently found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Without prejudice to the question whether the proceedings were of excessive length in the present case, the Court considers that the applicants have prima facie an “arguable” complaint as the domestic proceedings lasted for periods ranging from 14 years to more than 20 years (see the appended table). The applicants were therefore entitled to an effective remedy in that regard (ibid., § 48).
21. The Court reiterates that the correct interpretation of Article 13, when invoked in respect of an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time, is that that provision guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority (see Kudła, cited above, § 156). It points out that a remedy available to a litigant at domestic level for raising a complaint about the length of proceedings is “effective”, within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention, if it prevents the occurrence or continuation of the alleged violation or if it provides “adequate redress for any violation that [has] already occurred” (ibid., § 158).
22. When it comes to the assessment of the appropriateness of the award of non-pecuniary damage, the Court assumes that there is a strong but rebuttable presumption that excessively long proceedings will occasion non-pecuniary damage. It also accepts that, in some cases, the length of proceedings may result in only minimal non-pecuniary damage or no non‑pecuniary damage at all. The domestic courts will then have to justify their decision by giving sufficient reasons (Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, § 95, ECHR 2006-V).
23. With specific regard to the Italian legal system, in Delle Cave and Corrado v. Italy (no. 14626/03, §§ 43-46, 5 June 2007) the Court accepted that the provisions of the Pinto Act as in force at that time constituted an accessible and, in principle, effective remedy in respect of the excessive length of judicial proceedings. In particular, no violation of Article 13 of the Convention was found in that case since “the Pinto Act did not lay down any limits for the fixing of compensation: the amount of the award was left to the courts’ discretion”.
24. Moreover, the Court reiterates that, although a finding of a violation and the award of compensation at domestic level may in principle deprive an applicant of victim status, this is so only where the redress afforded is appropriate and sufficient. As stated in Cocchiarella (cited above, §§ 86-93), the adequacy of redress depends, inter alia, on the amount of compensation awarded in comparison with the sums which the Court would award in similar cases. Furthermore, while domestic courts may award lower amounts than those granted by the Court, such awards must nevertheless remain reasonably related to the Court’s case-law and must not be manifestly inadequate (ibid., §§ 93, 97 and 107).
25. In the present case, the events of which all occurred following the entry into force of the 2012 amendments to the Pinto Act, the domestic courts relied on Section 2 bis, paragraph 3 of the Pinto Act to award compensation for the excessive length of the proceedings, while simultaneously seeking to avoid the payment of excessive compensation for non-pecuniary damage. As acknowledged by the respondent Government, the objective underlying that provision is to establish a closer link between the “economic value of a claim” and the amount of “damage suffered by the litigant awaiting the outcome of his or her complaint”. They argued that national law sought to introduce a criterion for assessing compensation in accordance with the Convention and, in this way, it fulfilled a role comparable to the Court’s practice of declaring certain claims inadmissible – that is, to prevent misuse or abuse of the remedy.
26. The Court cannot agree with the Government in that regard. In fact, the domestic case-law referred to by the Government clearly shows that the national courts did not carry out any in concreto assessment of the above-mentioned criteria. This applies both to determining the amount of damage suffered by the parties – compare with Section 2, paragraph 2 sexies, point (g), of the Pinto Act, which allows for the dismissal of an appeal where “the triviality of the allegation or value of the claim is negligible, taking into account the personal circumstances of the litigant” – and justifying the quantification of non-pecuniary damage. Instead, once the ceiling established by Section 2 bis, paragraph 3, became applicable, the domestic courts treated the amount resulting from that provision as necessarily adequate, without examining whether the award remained reasonably related to the standards developed in the Court’s case-law or whether the applicants had advanced arguments capable of justifying a different assessment. In those circumstances, the Court considers that, although the provision is formally drafted as a limitation on compensation, its wording, coupled with the manner in which it was interpreted and applied in the present cases, resulted in a presumption of adequacy operating in practice as a binding and irrebuttable one.
27. Indeed, the Court observes that the compensation awarded in the present applications were subject to the statutory limitation contained in Section 2 bis, paragraph 3. As a result, the applicants received amounts which were substantially lower than those normally awarded under the Court’s well-established case-law for proceedings of comparable duration. In the Court’s view, compensation awarded at such a level cannot be regarded as appropriate and adequate redress for the violation complained of, having regard to the standards developed in its case-law. In this connection, the Court recalls that in Cocchiarella it emphasised that the principle of subsidiarity cannot lead to a result whereby the rights guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 are deprived of their substance (ibid., § 82).
28. The Court is therefore not persuaded by the Government’s argument that the compensation provided under Section 2 bis, paragraph 3, was sufficient and proportionate to the applicants’ suffering, thereby depriving them of victim status, since no individual assessment was made.
29. In the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds that by precluding a genuine assessment of the actual prejudice suffered by the applicants and by restricting the level of compensation available to them, Section 2 bis, paragraph 3, of the Pinto Act, in practice, was interpreted and applied by the domestic courts as an irrebuttable presumption that the resulting award constituted adequate redress for the excessive length of the proceedings, thereby rendering the Pinto remedy ineffective within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. The Government’s objection of loss of victim status must therefore be rejected and the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.
30. In line with its usual approach in cases where the length of proceedings is in issue, the Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be examined in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
31. The Court has on numerous occasions dealt with applications raising issues similar to those in the present case, where it has found a breach of the “reasonable time” requirement, having regard to the criteria set out above.
32. In the present applications, the Court notes that the length of the proceedings lasted from over 14 years to more than 20 years for between one and three levels of jurisdiction (see the appended table for details). Having regard to the overall duration of the proceedings, the material before it, as well as its case-law, the Court finds no circumstance capable of justifying such delays. Indeed, the domestic courts in the “Pinto” proceedings recognised that the length of the main proceedings had been excessive in the applicants’ cases (see the appended table). It follows that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
33. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
34. The applicant in application no. 44596/18 did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to make any award under this head to him.
35. In the remainder of the applications, the applicants claimed various amounts in respect of non-pecuniary damage (see the appended table).
36. The Government contested these claims, arguing that they had not been sufficiently proved and that, in any event, they were excessive.
37. In the light of the documents in its possession and its case‑law (see, in particular, Cocchiarella, cited above), the Court considers it reasonable to award for non-pecuniary damage the sums indicated in the appended table.
38. In relation to costs and expense, the applicant in application no. 13410/23 failed to provide supporting documents demonstrating that the costs claimed had been actually and necessarily incurred. Accordingly, no award is made in respect of this application.
39. In application no. 36375/24, the applicants submitted supporting invoices in respect of their claim for costs and expenses.
40. The Government objected as to the reasonableness of the applicants’ claims.
41. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its established case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award 3,000 euros jointly to the applicants in application no. 36375/24 for costs and expenses for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
Done in English, and notified in writing on 29 October 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Liv Tigerstedt Erik Wennerström Deputy Registrar President
APPENDIX
List of cases:
No.
Application no.Date of introduction
Case name
Applicant’s nameYear of birthPlace of residenceNationality
Represented by
Domestic main proceedings
Total length of the proceedings
Subject of the main proceedings and value of the related claim
“Pinto” proceedings
Domestic award
(in euros)
Just satisfaction claims
Amount awarded for non-pecuniary damage per applicant
(in euros)[1]
Amount awarded for costs and expenses per application (in euros)[2]
44596/1812/09/2018
Andreani v. Italy
Egidio ANDREANI1942CattolicaItalian
Piero GUALTIERI
1) District Court of Pesaro:
application lodged on 05/02/1998;
judgment of 05/09/2005 (R.G. 391/1998)
2) Court of Appeal of Ancona:
appeal lodged on 02/10/2006;
judgment of 19/07/2012 (R.G. 953/2006)
Length: 14 years, 5 months, 14 days, for 2 levels of jurisdiction
Compensation for damage resulting from the unlawful revocation of planning permission
EUR 2,953.22
Application lodged on 05/06/2013
Court of Appeal of L’Aquila – R.G. 220/2013 V.G. – Decree of 25/03/2014
Court of Appeal of L’Aquila (upon opposition) – R.G. 135/2014 V.G. – Decree of 18/05/2016
Court of Cassation – R.G. 17902/2016 – Judgment of 16/04/2018
2,953.22
None
13410/2321/03/2023
Miglietta v. Italy
Vincenzo MIGLIETTA1943StateItalian
Mario ROCCAFORTE
1) Labour Court of Taranto:Application lodged on 11/02/2000;
judgment of 16/02/2009
(R.G. 2373/2000)
2) Court of Appeal of Lecce:
Appeal lodged on 29/03/2010;
judgment of 12/02/2015 (R.G. 253/2010)
3) Court of Cassation
Appeal lodged on 06/07/2015;
judgment of 16/01/2020 (R.G. 17448/2015)
Length: 19 years, 11 months, 5 days
3 levels of jurisdiction
Labour court compensation proceedings for damages arising from the failure to pay social security contributions and breach of an agreement with the employer
EUR 655.89
Application lodged on 12/10/2020
Court of Appeal of Lecce – R.G. 482/2020 V.G. – Decree of 21/11/2020
Court of Appeal of Lecce (upon opposition) – R.G. 670/2020 V.G. – Decree of 11/11/2021
Court of Cassation – R.G. 11515/2022 – Judgment of 17/01/2023
655.89
In respect of non-pecuniary damage, the applicant left the amount to be determined by the Court, indicating that the award should be calculated on the basis of EUR 800 per year of excessive length;
-costs and expenses: 3,500
12,700
36375/2422/11/2024
Aguiari and Others v. Italy
Alessandro AGUIARI1964FirenzeItalianMaria CASORIA1956Sesto FiorentinoItalianGandolfo CURCIO1977Certaldo
Italian
Leonardo FURNARI1947Sesto FiorentinoItalianSilvia GUARNIERI1962LarcianoItalianElvio LIBBRA1952Colle Di Val D’elsaItalianNenad MILOSAVLJEVIC1964Ponte BuggianeseItalian
Maurizio PINELLI1949RufinaItalianNora SARDELLI1962CalenzanoItalian
Andrea SACCUCCI
1) District Court of Prato
Executive admission of the applicants’ credits to bankruptcy proceedings of 20/05/1999;
decree closing the bankruptcy proceedings with final distribution of 19/02/2020
(R.F. 3371/1998)
Length: 20 years, 8 months, 30 days
1 level of jurisdiction
Participation in bankruptcy proceedings as holders of employment-related claims
Alessandro Aguiari
EUR 4,082.36
Maria Casoria
EUR 741.62
Gandolfo Curcio
EUR 794.16
Leonardo Furnari
EUR 146.35
Silvia Guarnieri EUR 3,389.66
Elvio Libbra
EUR 600.93
Nenad Milosaljevic EUR 489.96
Maurizio Pinelli
EUR 4,376.71
Nora Sardelli EUR 847.68
Application lodged on 08/12/2020
Court of Appeal of Florence – R.G. 764/2020 V.G. – Decree of 19/01/2021
Court of Appeal of Florence (upon opposition) – R.G. 45/2021 V.G. – Decree of 22/06/2021
Court of Cassation – R.G. 2874/2022 – Judgment of 23/07/2024
4,082.36
741.62
Gandolfo
Curcio
794.16
146.35
Silvia Guarnieri
3,389.66
Elvio
Libbra
600.93
Nenad Milosaljevi
489.96
Maurizio
Pinelli
4,376.71
Nora Sardelli
847.68
In respect of non-pecuniary damages:
Alessandro Aguiari 16,917.64;
Maria Casoria 20,258.38;
Gandolfo Curcio 20,205.84;
Leonardo Fornati 20,853.65;
17,610.34;
Elvio Libbra 20,399.07;
Nenad Milosaljevic
20,510.04;
Maurizio Pinelli 16,623.29;
Nora Sardelli 20,152.32.
In respect of costs and expenses: 729.56 per applicant
6,800
Maria
Casoria
10,100
Leonardo
Furnari
10,700
Silvia
Guarnieri
7,500
10,300
Nenad Milosaljevic 10,400
6,500
10,000
3,000
[1] Plus any tax that may be chargeable.
[2] Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.
