CASE OF GAICIUC v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF GAICIUC v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

(Application no. 23926/18)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

29 October 2026

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Gaiciuc v. the Republic of Moldova,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

María Elósegui, President, Diana Sârcu, Sébastien Biancheri, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 23926/18) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 4 May 2018 by a Moldovan national, Ms Valentina Gaiciuc (“the applicant”), who was born in 1954 and lives in Calarașovca, and was represented by Ms I. Raducan, a lawyer practising in Ocnița;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their acting Agent, Ms D. Maimescu;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 8 October 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The case concerns the refusal of the Supreme Court of Justice to examine an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant, owing to her failure to pay court fees. The applicant complained of a limitation of her right of access to a court in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

2. On 25 February 2009 a private company, C., borrowed 420,000 Moldovan lei (MDL – equivalent to 30,080 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) from a bank. According to the terms of the contract, the loan was secured by the applicant, who was acting as a personal guarantor, and by a collateral agreement signed by her.

3. On 30 May 2011 the bank initiated court proceedings against the applicant and the C. company, seeking the repayment of the loan.

4. In September 2011 the applicant became aware that her deposit held with the same bank in the amount of MDL 74,512 (equivalent to EUR 5,336 at the relevant time) had been taken out of her account on an unknown date.

5. On 31 October 2013 the applicant lodged a counterclaim, seeking the annulment of the loan and collateral contract, the recovery of the deposit and accrued interest, and compensation in respect of court expenses and non‑pecuniary damage. She argued that she had not agreed to guarantee the loan and that her signature had been forged. The applicant paid the court fees in the amount of MDL 2,235 (equivalent to EUR 125 at the relevant time), which represented 3% of the value of her counterclaim.

6. On 18 December 2015 the Ocnița District Court upheld the counterclaim lodged by the applicant and ordered the bank to refund her the sum taken from her deposit account but rejected her claim for interest and non-pecuniary damages. It held that the applicant could bring a new civil action in that respect under a general provision of the Civil Code.

7. On 13 June 2017 the Bălți Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant and upheld the first-instance court’s judgment.

8. On 26 September 2017 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law and paid the court fees amounting to MDL 1,118 (equivalent to EUR 105 at the relevant time), corresponding to half of the initial fees she had paid when submitting her counterclaim, as provided for by the legal provisions in force at the material time.

9. On 14 November 2017 the Supreme Court of Justice left the appeal on points of law unexamined, holding that the applicant had not paid the full amount of the court fees, namely MDL 5,493 (equivalent to EUR 243 at the relevant time) and gave the applicant additional time to pay the remainder. The court did not explain the method used to calculate that amount. The applicant submitted that she had not paid the requested amounts and on an unspecified date the Supreme Court of Justice decided with final effect not to examine her case on account of the non-payment of the court fees.

10. After lodging her application with the Court, on 30 May 2018 the applicant complained to the Edineț District Court about the non-enforcement of the judgment of 18 December 2015. During the proceedings, the applicant withdrew her claim after the bank had transferred the money to her deposit account. On 9 October 2018 the Edineț District Court accepted her request to withdraw the action and discontinued the proceedings.

RELEvant domestic law

11. A summary of applicable domestic law provisions is available in Graciova v. Republic of Moldova ([Committee], no. 43404/08 §§ 15-17, 15 January 2019).

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

12. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention of a restriction of her right of access to the Supreme Court of Justice, owing to the imposition of court fees in a higher amount than that provided by law.

13. The Government, referring to the arguments provided by the first‑instance court (see paragraph 6 above), argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust available domestic remedies. Specifically, they argued that the applicant should have lodged a new claim seeking compensation for the interest and in respect of non-pecuniary damage. They also argued that the application constituted an abuse of the right of individual petition because the applicant had failed to inform the Court that the judgment had been enforced and her deposit account had been refunded. The Government further argued that the applicant had lost her victim status, as she had been refunded the money.

14. The applicant did not make any submissions concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies. She submitted that although she had received back her initial deposit, her application with the Court concerned the Supreme Court of Justice’s refusal to examine her appeal on points of law in respect of the remaining part of her counterclaim (see paragraphs 6 and 9 above). She further argued that although she had withdrawn her complaint regarding the enforcement of the judgment (see paragraph 10 above), the merits of her remaining claims had not been examined.

15. The Court notes that the central issue of the applicant’s complaint is that the Supreme Court of Justice did not examine the merits of her appeal on points of law against the decisions of the lower courts, which had dismissed her claims for interest and non-pecuniary damages. The domestic courts indeed referred to the possibility that the applicant could lodge a separate claim. However, the operative part of the first-instance court’s decision explicitly dismissed her claims in that respect – and did not discontinue the proceedings – and the appellate court upheld the decision. The applicant should not be required to bring the same action again, because this would not address her complaint concerning the lack of access to a higher court. For these reasons, the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.

16. The Court takes note of the circumstances of the case (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above) and that the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 of the Convention concerns a restriction on the right of access to a higher court. The Court does not consider that the applicant abused her right of individual petition.

17. The Court further notes that the fact that the applicant obtained a decision which partially upheld her claims and managed to have it enforced does not alter the fact that her claims in respect of the interest and non‑pecuniary damage were dismissed by lower courts and her appeal on points of law was not examined. Therefore, she may still claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention in relation to the remaining part of her claims which were dismissed by the lower courts and in respect of which she did not have a determination on the merits of her appeal on points of law. The Court thus dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection concerning the applicant’s victim status.

18. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

19. The applicant submitted that when lodging her appeal on points of law, she had paid the court fee corresponding to half of the amount paid by her when lodging her counterclaim. She relied on section 3 of Law no. 1216/1992 on Court Fees, as in force at the material time (see paragraph 11 above). She further submitted that the Supreme Court of Justice should have based its calculation on the value of her claim in the amount of MDL 74,512 (equivalent to EUR 5,536).

20. The Government acknowledged the error made by the Supreme Court of Justice in calculating the amount of the court fee due. However, they argued that it had not affected the applicant’s situation, since the lower courts had granted her claim and the money taken from her bank deposit account had been returned. They further submitted that the Supreme Court of Justice had admitted a technical error and that the method of calculation of the court fee had not resulted from any legislative deficiency.

21. The general principles concerning access to a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and more specifically the requirement to pay court fees, have been summarised in Kreuz v. Poland (no. 28249/95, §§ 52-57, ECHR 2001-VI), Malahov v. Moldova (no. 32268/02, §§ 25-30, 7 June 2007), and Zubac v. Croatia [GC], (no. 40160/12, §§ 76-78, 5 April 2018).

22. The Court notes that it has not been disputed by the parties that the applicant was refused an examination of the merits of her appeal on points of law on the ground of unpaid court fees while the calculation of the fees due was contrary to domestic law.

23. In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the Supreme Court of Justice’s refusal to examine the merits of the applicant’s case by imposing an amount of the court fee contrary to the provisions of domestic law was unforeseeable and therefore restricted the applicant’s right of access to a court to such extent as to impair the very essence of that right. It also notes that the applicant cannot be criticised for having failed to pay the amount of the court fee provided for by law, let alone the higher unforeseeable amount subsequently imposed by the Supreme Court of Justice (see, mutatis mutandis, Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, no. 15736/16, §§ 108‑14, 15 May 2025).

24. Accordingly, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

25. The applicant claimed 204 euros (EUR) in respect of costs and expenses, without specifying if they had been incurred before the domestic courts or before the Court. In respect of pecuniary damage, she requested to be awarded amounts in interest and non-pecuniary damages stemming from the merits of her case before the domestic courts. The applicant also asked the Court to award her non-pecuniary damages in respect of the violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, without, however, specifying any amount.

26. The Government invited the Court to dismiss the applicant’s claims in their entirety, arguing that they were neither clear nor substantiated.

27. The applicant submitted her relevant observations and just satisfaction claims outside the time-limit. However, after being provided with the reasons for the delayed submissions, on 26 March 2026 the President of the Section decided, pursuant to Rule 38 § 1 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant’s submission of 23 March 2026 should be included in the case file for the consideration of the Court.

28. The Court notes that the violation found above stems from the domestic courts’ failure to examine the applicant’s claims on their merits, and that it cannot speculate as to outcome of those proceedings had there been no breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Moreover, after an eventual reopening of the present case, the domestic courts would be better placed to assess the amount of damage. The Court therefore rejects the claim in respect of pecuniary damage. However, it awards the applicant EUR 3,600 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

29. Furthermore, under Rule 60 § 2, itemised particulars of all claims, together with any relevant supporting documents, are to be submitted, failing which the claim for costs and expenses may be rejected in whole or in part. The Court notes that the applicant failed to provide it with any supporting documents and therefore makes no award in respect of costs and expenses.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

Done in English, and notified in writing on 29 October 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Martina Keller María Elósegui Deputy Registrar President