FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF GENDERDOC-M v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
(Application no. 23907/15)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
29 October 2026
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Genderdoc-M v. the Republic of Moldova,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
María Elósegui, President, Diana Sârcu, Sébastien Biancheri, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 23907/15) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 5 May 2015 by Public Association Centre for Information Genderdoc‑M (Asociaţia Obştească Centrul de Informaţii Genderdoc-M; “the applicant association”), registered in Chișinău and represented by Ms D. Străisteanu, a lawyer practising in Chișinău;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent at the time, Mr D. Obadă;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 8 October 2026,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the failure to carry out an effective investigation and punishment of persons involved in the interruption of a gay pride march.
2. On 17 May 2014 a march called “A year without discrimination” was organised in Chișinău by the applicant association to mark the international day against homophobia. The march was under heavy protection by the police and special units, which separated the participants from the several dozens of rather aggressive persons wishing to disrupt it. Some of those persons chanted homophobic slogans and insults and explicitly threatened participants of the march with violence, even stating that they would hang such persons. C., an orthodox priest who had repeatedly protested against events organised by the LGBT community, managed to approach the participants of the march and to wrestle away from the hands of one of the organisers (D., who worked for the applicant association) a rainbow flag, tearing it apart. According to D.’s statement to the police, she had been holding the flag firmly and C. had hit her hands several times in order to obtain it. Witnesses E. and M., who also worked for the applicant association, told the police that they had seen C. aggressively wrestle away the flag. In doing so, he had hit E. on the shoulder and had also hit other participants of the march, who had been frightened. The applicant association and a number of witnesses noted that the media had followed the march closely, recording all the events. One of the videos apparently shows a priest being stopped by the police from reaching the demonstrators and subsequently resisting them, and managing to break free from their hold using energetic movements.
3. Another protestor (G.) grabbed a banner from the organisers leading the march and refused to return it or to move, thus blocking their passage. Eventually, the participants of the march had to abandon the banner and continue their march, while the police arrested G.
4. On 26 June 2014 the applicant association lodged two criminal complaints about the actions of C. and G., notably under Article 184 of the Criminal Code (violation of the right to freedom of assembly by unlawfully impeding a public event, while, inter alia, applying violence not threatening the life or health) and Article 187 (robbery). It referred to the attempts to block the march and to the fact that the two suspects had openly and forcibly taken from the applicant association’s staff two objects which were never returned to it.
5. On 9 July 2014 a criminal investigation was initiated into the allegations made by the applicant association. On 27 October 2014 the prosecutor responsible for the case discontinued the investigation, finding that the actions of the two suspects did not amount to a criminal offence, but rather an administrative one. He found in particular that it had not been established that the two suspects had acted together. Moreover, in the absence of any forensic report there was no medical evidence of bodily harm to any participant of the march. Lastly, he found that the three-month prescription applicable to administrative offences prevented pursuing the accused for the administrative offence committed. That decision was upheld by a higher prosecutor.
6. On 27 January 2015 the investigating judge of the Chișinău District Court (Râșcani District) annulled the prosecutors’ decisions, finding that not all actions had been taken, notably to verify whether the two suspects had planned and acted together.
7. On 8 April 2015 the applicant association asked the prosecutor to inform it of the progress of the investigation and whether any decision had been taken. They subsequently found out that the investigation had been reopened and more witnesses heard on 11 February and 9 March 2015, following which the investigation had once more been discontinued on 20 March 2015. The applicant association did not challenge that decision.
8. Referring to Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 23914/15, §§ 24‑26, 14 December 2021) the Government argued that the applicant association could not claim to be a victim of the alleged violation, since it neither represented individual applicants nor had shown how its own rights had been affected.
9. The Court notes that, unlike in Genderdoc-M and M.D. (cited above), in the present case the applicant association was directly affected by the alleged breach of Article 14 taken together with Article 11 of the Convention, given that its ability to carry out a planned public event was affected by the actions of the relevant protestors (see Identoba and Others v. Georgia, no. 73235/12, §§ 47‑49, 12 May 2015). It accordingly rejects the Government’s objection regarding the victim status of the applicant association.
10. The Government also argued that the applicant association had failed to exhaust available domestic remedies. In particular, it had not appealed against the prosecutor’s decision of 20 March 2015 to discontinue the investigation.
11. The Court considers that this objection is closely related to the merits of the applicant association’s complaints under Article 14 taken together with Article 11 of the Convention. It will therefore examine this preliminary objection together with the merits of these complaints.
12. The Court further notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
13. The general principles concerning non-discrimination, notably in the context of disrupting public events because of the sexual orientation of the participants therein, have been summarised in Identoba and Others (cited above, §§ 93‑96). In particular, the Court has considered that the State violates its obligations under the principle of non-discrimination on account of a failure to protect demonstrators from homophobic violence and to launch an effective investigation (see also Berkman v. Russia, no. 46712/15, § 49, 1 December 2020, and Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, no. 19237/16, § 141, 1 June 2021).
14. In the present case, the Court considers that by positioning himself in front of the people marching and then grabbing a banner used by the demonstrators, G. disrupted the march organised by the applicant association. Likewise, C. interfered with the march when he violently wrestled a rainbow flag from D.’s hands, while hitting her and several other demonstrators.
15. The authorities’ positive obligations in this context consisted, on the one hand, in preventing any disruption, notably in view of the long‑standing and occasionally violent opposition by various groups to marches of the LGBT community in the Republic of Moldova and, on the other hand, in the obligation to investigate. In this context, the Court notes that both C. and G. openly stated that their actions had been inspired by their hatred against the members of the LGBT community and their actions took place in the context of insulting and threatening behaviour by several dozens of protestors. Therefore, in accordance with the requirements of Article 14 of the Convention, the authorities had the obligation to verify the existence of homophobic intent on the part of the two suspects.
16. The Court observes that a criminal investigation was promptly initiated against the two identified suspects. However, it was discontinued because not all the elements of the offence had been met. In particular, it had not been shown that C. and G. had acted together. As concerns C.’s actions, the Court observes that the relevant offence could be committed in several ways. The prosecution focused on one manner, namely where two or more persons act in prior agreement to block the public event. However, no investigation was apparently made into whether the same offence had been committed in another manner, namely by using violence not endangering the health and life of persons. Several witnesses mentioned C.’s aggressive behaviour which included physically attacking them during the incident with the flag. The authorities did not explain why this conduct could not be considered as being use of violence within the meaning of Article 184 of the Criminal Code.
17. Moreover, the applicant association noted that the media had extensively covered the march, filming all the events. No mention was made in the prosecutors’ decisions of any attempt to find footage of the incident with the flag to verify the witness statements regarding the use of violence or to identify additional witnesses of the incident.
18. The Court further observes that the prosecution had to know that if criminal charges were not pressed, administrative sanctions could only be applied within three months from the date of the events. Therefore, by waiting until five months had passed since the events complained of and then dropping the criminal charges in favour of administrative ones, the prosecuting authority knowingly allowed both suspects to avoid all responsibility, effectively amounting to total impunity (see, mutatis mutandis, O.R. and L.R. v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 24129/11, § 77, 30 October 2018).
19. The Court concludes that by failing to explore whether criminal law was applicable owing to violence inspired by homophobic intent and applied to participants of a march organised by the applicant association in order to disrupt that public event, the authorities have not fulfilled their positive obligations under Article 11 taken together with Article 14 of the Convention. Moreover, the repeated discontinuation of the investigation on the same grounds and without verifying important aspects such as possible homophobic intent and the absence of any attempt to view media recordings in order to establish whether C. had indeed applied violence, as claimed by a number of persons, meant that the investigation was inefficient. In such circumstances, the applicant association was no longer under the obligation to repeatedly seek the annulment of the prosecutor’s decision to discontinue the investigation (see Mătăsaru and Saviţchi v. Moldova, no. 38281/08, § 94, 2 November 2010). Therefore, the Government’s objection concerning the failure to exhaust available domestic remedies, previously joined to the merits, must be dismissed.
20. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 11 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.
21. The applicant association also raised other complaints under Articles 10, 11 and 13 taken alone or together with Article 14 of the Convention. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties and its findings above, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal questions raised by the case and that there is no need to examine the remaining complaints (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).
22. The applicant association claimed 12,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 1,274 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court.
23. The Government argued that the sums claimed were excessive and unsubstantiated.
24. The Court awards the applicant association EUR 4,500 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
25. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the entire sum claimed for costs and expenses.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 29 October 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Martina Keller María Elósegui Deputy Registrar President
