Communicated on 3 June 2020Published on 22 June 2020
FIFTH SECTION
Application no. 27798/17Magnus GUDMUNDSSONagainst Icelandlodged on 5 April 2017
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The application concerns the applicant’s indictment and conviction for financial crimes, following the financial crisis of 2008.
The applicant was the CEO of Kaupthing Luxembourg, a subsidiary of Kaupthing Bank hf. He was indicted on 15 March 2013 and charged with market manipulation and fraud by abuse of position (umboðssvik) on eleven counts. By a judgment of 26 June 2015, the District Court of Reykjavík dismissed two of the counts against the applicant, and acquitted him on the other nine counts. Appeal was made against the judgment to the Supreme Court of Iceland, which partly overturned the applicant’s acquittal and convicted him as an accessory to one count of market manipulation and one count of fraud by abuse of position. No punishment was imposed on him.
The applicant complains that his right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal was violated on account of the alleged connections of two Supreme Court Justices sitting on the panel in his case, namely I.E. and Þ.Ö. The applicant further complains that his right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal was violated due to the alleged financial interests of the Supreme Court Justices sitting on the panel in his cases, namely I.E., M.S., Ó.B.Þ. and V.M.M.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
Communicated on 3 June 2020Published on 22 June 2020
FIFTH SECTION
Application no. 27798/17Magnus GUDMUNDSSONagainst Icelandlodged on 5 April 2017
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The application concerns the applicant’s indictment and conviction for financial crimes, following the financial crisis of 2008.
The applicant was the CEO of Kaupthing Luxembourg, a subsidiary of Kaupthing Bank hf. He was indicted on 15 March 2013 and charged with market manipulation and fraud by abuse of position (umboðssvik) on eleven counts. By a judgment of 26 June 2015, the District Court of Reykjavík dismissed two of the counts against the applicant, and acquitted him on the other nine counts. Appeal was made against the judgment to the Supreme Court of Iceland, which partly overturned the applicant’s acquittal and convicted him as an accessory to one count of market manipulation and one count of fraud by abuse of position. No punishment was imposed on him.
The applicant complains that his right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal was violated on account of the alleged connections of two Supreme Court Justices sitting on the panel in his case, namely I.E. and Þ.Ö. The applicant further complains that his right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal was violated due to the alleged financial interests of the Supreme Court Justices sitting on the panel in his cases, namely I.E., M.S., Ó.B.Þ. and V.M.M.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. In respect of the applicant’s complaint that Justices I.E. and Þ.Ö. had connections to the case, has there been a violation of the applicant’s right to a trial by an independent and impartial tribunal under Article 6 § 1? (see, inter alia, Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369/10, §§ 73-78, 23 April 2015, Pétur Thór Sigurdsson v. Iceland, no. 39731/98, §§ 37-46, 10 April 2003, and Sigurður Einarsson and Others v. Iceland, no. 39757/15, 4 June 2019, §§ 41-62).
2. In respect of the complaints regarding the independence and impartiality of the Supreme Court panel on account of the alleged financial interests of the judges, has the applicant complied with the applicable six‑month time-limit in accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as regards each of the two Supreme Court judgments against him? In the light of the nature of these complaints, on which date did the time-limit for the applicant to lodge a complaint before the Court commence?
In respect of these complaints, has the applicant exhausted available domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, what was the available domestic remedy with respect to the applicant’s complaints related to the alleged impartiality of Justices I.E., M.S., Ó.B.Þ. and V.M.M.? At what time did the remedy become available to the applicant? What relevance in this respect should be ascribed to the procedure which was then in force under Article 9 of the Rules No. 463/2000, on Additional Functions of District Court and Supreme Court Judges and their Ownership in Companies and Undertakings, for requesting information on the ownership in companies of serving judges from the Committee on Judicial Functions (nefnd um dómarastörf)?
Has there been a violation of the applicant’s right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see, inter alia, Pétur Þór Sigurðsson v. Iceland, no. 39731/98, ECHR 2003‑IV and Sigurður Einarsson and Others v. Iceland, cited above)? In particular, did four of the five Supreme Court Justices who decided the criminal case against the applicant on appeal, namely I.E., M.S., Ó.B.Þ. and V.M.M., have financial interests in one or more of the three collapsed Icelandic banks, Landsbanki, Glitnir and Kaupthing, when the events occurred which formed the basis for the applicant’s convictions? If so, what was the relevance for the assessment of their alleged impartiality of the condition in Article 7 § 3 of Rules No. 463/2000 (see above), then in force, that a serving judge was required to seek permission from the Committee on Judicial Functions to own more than ISK 3,000,000 in a company listed on the stock exchange, or to hold more than a 5% share in other companies?
